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The people of Israel camped at Rephidim, but there was 
no water for the people to drink. Therefore the people 
quarreled with Moses and said, "Give us water to drink." 
And Moses said to them, "Why do you quarrel with me?" 
But the people thirsted there for water, and the people 
grumbled against Moses and said, "Why did you bring us 
up out of Egypt, to kill us and our children and our 
livestock with thirst?" So Moses cried to the Lord, "What 
shall I do with this people? They are almost ready to 
stone me." And the Lord said to Moses, "Take in your 
hand the staff with which you struck the Nile, and go. 
Behold, I will stand before you there on the rock at 
Horeb, and you shall strike the rock, and water shall 
come out of it, and the people will drink." 
—Exodus 17:1-7, The Old Testament 
* * * * 
INTRODUCTION 
In the promised land of milk and honey, the most basic of human elixirs 
is still the most precious. Myriad disagreements paralyze the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process in 2011, but the water crisis may be the most 
intractable. 
Israeli NGOs estimate an average West Bank Palestinian's water 
consumption to be about 37 liters per day, and an average Israeli's to be about 
211 liters.1 By comparison, "First World" countries like the U.S. and Canada 
                                                             
1 The Gap in Water Consumption Between Palestinians and Israelis, 
B'TSELEM ONLINE (Jan. 1, 2013), available at http://www.btselem.org/ 
english/water/consumption_gap [hereinafter Water Consumption]; see also 
Hilal Elver, Palestinian-Israeli Water Conflict and Implementation of 
International Water Law Principles, 28 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 
421, 427 (2005) (indicating that per capita Palestinian consumption is 
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typically afford around 700 liters per capita; and according to World Health 
Organization standards, people with an annual per capita consumption of less 
than 100 liters live in a condition of "severe water stress."2 The Israeli and 
Palestinian statistics become even more ominous when one considers that the 
majority of Israeli "consumption" is allotted to agricultural irrigation, rather 
than potable use, and that most of an average Palestinian's drinking water is 
horribly polluted by ground minerals and mismanaged sewage disposal 
tracts.3 Moreover, regional forecasts look dry: the current fifteen year-long 
drought is projected to continue, and the Israeli-Palestinian population will 
double in the next 25 years. 
The water shortage is largely due to geography and climate. There are 
two major water sources in the region: the surface waters of the Jordan River 
Basin—shared by Israel with the surrounding Arab countries—and the 
groundwater of the mountain aquifers extending beneath the West Bank and 
across the Green Line into Israel. Climate change and over-exploitation of the 
surface waters have greatly depleted the mighty Jordan of biblical times. 
"When I was a boy," Mark Twain wrote upon first glimpsing the river, "I 
somehow got the impression that [it] was four thousand miles long and thirty-
five miles wide. It is not any wider than Broadway in New York."4 Today, the 
Jordan alternates in size between rivulet and creek. 
Still, Israel extracts fresh water from Lake Tiberias (the biblical "Sea of 
Galilee") and it has already diminished the Jordan tributary for much of its 
                                                                                                                              
realistically much lower because of the large proportion of consumption 
devoted to agricultural irrigation). 
2 Elver, supra note 1, at 426. 
3 Water Consumption, supra note 1, at 427; see, e.g., YEHEZKEL LEIN, 
THIRSTY FOR A SOLUTION: THE WATER CRISIS IN THE OCCUPIED 
TERRITORIES AND ITS RESOLUTION IN THE FINAL-STATUS AGREEMENT 14, 
59–60 (2000), available at http://www.btselem.org/publications/summaries/ 
200007_thirsty_for_a_solution [hereinafter B'TSELEM POSITION PAPER]. 
4 MARK TWAIN, THE INNOCENTS ABROAD 597 (Shelley Fisher Fishkin 
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1869). 
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domestic use, leaving the downstream Palestinian population with what has 
been described as a "drainage ditch."5 The mountain aquifer's underground 
chambers—divided between the Western, Northeastern, and Eastern sub-
basins—are therefore critical; they are also, however, the subject of 
contention between the Israelis and Palestinians because the basins cross 
political lines, complicating issues of ownership and control. 
While about eighty percent of the aquifer resides below West Bank soil, 
collecting mostly from rainfall in the West Bank, eighty percent of the 
potable water flows into Israeli territory and is stored there;6 it is indisputable 
that most of the aquifer water originates in the Palestinian territories, but 
comes to rest in Israel. Mekorot, the private Israeli company that has enjoyed 
a monopoly on water utility management since 1982, then pumps the 
collected water throughout the country and into the territories at fixed prices 
(before distribution costs). Estimates vary, but on balance, it appears that 
Israelis consume roughly ten times as much water as the Palestinians do from 
these sub-basins.7 
It is perhaps unsurprising how little attention the world devotes to the 
Israeli-Palestinian water conflict compared to suicide bombings and refugees. 
The battle lines here do not appear on CNN; they are literally subterranean, 
hidden from view beneath the arid soil. The 1990s peace process brought 
water allocation to the forefront of negotiations for the first time, and Article 
40, Annex III of the 1995 Oslo II Interim Agreement provided a framework 
for cooperation. Israel turned over water distribution responsibilities in the 
West Bank to the Palestinian Authority, while effectively retaining control 
over well license permits. It also set concrete benchmarks for short-term 
                                                             
5 Brandon Hollinder, Note, A Golden State Solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian Water Conflict, 30 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 103, 109–
10 (2006). 
6 See, e.g., David J. Scarpa, Hydropolitics in Recent Israeli-Palestinian 
Relations, 2 HYDROLOGY: SCI. & PRACTICE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 147, 
150 (British Hydrological Society 2004). 
7 See, e.g., Elver, supra note 1, at 427. 
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Palestinian water needs, with full water rights to be defined at Final Status 
Negotiations.8 
Since 1995, the peace process has repeatedly collapsed, and Final Status 
talks appear unlikely in the near future. Both parties have resorted to 
inflammatory allegations that the other is violating the Interim Agreement: 
the Palestinian Authority (P.A.) claims Israel is violating international law by 
denying the Palestinians their sovereign water rights and engaging in 
discriminatory pricing, while Israel claims the P.A. is negligently 
mismanaging water and stubbornly refusing to optimize alternative water 
resources.9 The two parties stare across the diplomatic impasse, and all the 
while, the Sea of Galilee is at its lowest level in recorded history, annual 
rainfall continues to drop, and the Palestinian population is skyrocketing.10 
This article argues that the legal debate over "water rights" of the West 
Bank aquifer is counter-productive; the seemingly relevant international law 
is largely inapposite, and the 1995 Interim Agreement, intended as a 
temporary framework rather than a lasting resolution, creates disputes rather 
than resolving them. Instead of wrangling over problematic legal frameworks, 
the Palestinian Authority should recruit private sector investment of foreign 
and domestic capital to develop alternative West Bank water sources, such as 
desalination and wastewater treatment, and they should modernize their 
inefficient water delivery infrastructure. Focusing on privatization 
                                                             
8 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip, Isr.-PLO, Sept. 28, 1995, 36 I.L.M. 551, Annex III, art. 40, cl. 3–4 
[hereinafter Oslo II]. See APPENDIX I for the full text of Olso II's water 
article. 
9 See WATER AUTHORITY STATE OF ISRAEL, THE ISSUE OF WATER 
BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS 21, 27 (2009) [hereinafter "IWA 
REPORT"], available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANK 
GAZA/resources/israelwaterauthorityresponse.pdf. 
10 Alon Tal, Thirsting for Pragmatism: A Constructive Alternative to 
Amnesty International's Report on Palestinian Access to Water, 4 ISR. J. 
FOREIGN AFF., No. 2, 2010, at 59, 64. 
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techniques11 to increase the quantity and quality of usable water would offer 
the following advantages: (1) it would dramatically increase Palestinians' 
access to potable water; (2) reduce West Bank Palestinians' dependence on 
Mekorot and Israeli pricing; (3) remove the water conflict from the 
diplomatic arena's clogged channels and diffuse tensions in the peace process; 
and (4) perhaps most importantly, deprive Israel of its primary political 
argument against the Palestinian water rights claims—that the P.A. ignores its 
governing responsibilities by wastefully mismanaging its resources, refusing 
to explore alternative water supply techniques, and holding progress hostage 
to Final Status talks. Water privatization is a chance for the Palestinian 
Authority to disprove the famous quote by Israeli diplomat Abba Eban that 
"the Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity." 
In Part I, this article will discuss the unworkable deficiencies of both 
international water law and the 1995 Interim Agreement as applied to the 
mountain aquifer dispute. Part II will explain how private sector recruitment 
offers an ideal solution to the Palestinians' political concerns; discuss the 
challenges associated with private participation in water management; outline 
how the recent economic growth, relative political stability, and surge of 
'Fayyadist' state-building philosophy in the West Bank offer a unique and 
unprecedented opportunity for privatizing water development; and then apply 
the lessons of Gaza's water market experiment to West Bank prospects. 
This article does not dismiss the normative claims of the Palestinians to 
the region's water, nor bless Israel's historical water allocation to the West 
Bank. It merely argues that international water law is inadequate for 
adjudicating the dispute and that recent demographic and climate trends have 
rendered the region's available resources unsustainable. Circumstances 
demand more than politically charged redistribution at the expense of one 
party. They demand innovative development of new water sources and 
optimization of existing ones—demands the private sector can help meet. 
                                                             
11 It is important to note that I am not advocating full privatization of the 
entirety of the Palestinian water supply, but, rather, suggesting a role for the 
private sector in helping develop alternative water sources. 
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I. LEAKS AND LOOPHOLES: THE LIMITATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL 
WATER LAW 
The majority global perception casts Israel as a nation flouting its 
international legal obligations—a state that feels entitled to exceptional 
treatment, either as a result of its people's troubled history, its unique alliance 
with the United States, or other reasons.12 This view, at least in the abstract, is 
misplaced. Although Israel reserves the right, like most nations (including the 
United States), to interpret customary international law, it does not require 
                                                             
12 Much of this criticism is founded upon the belief that Israel is illegally 
occupying Palestinian territory, and interfering with the Palestinians' right to 
self-determination. The most oft-cited international law on occupation, 
however—Article 4 of the 4th Geneva Convention and Article 43 of the 
Hague Regulations—does not address the distinction between "lawful" and 
"unlawful" occupation, but rather the obligations of the occupying power 
once military occupation has occurred. For a recent discussion of the notable 
absence of occupation legality language in international law, see Armed 
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 
ICJ 64 (Dec. 19) separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans. 
Although Aharon Barak of the Israeli High Court of Justice has 
described Israel's presence in the West Bank as "belligerent occupation," HCJ 
393/82 Teachers' Housing Cooperative Society v. The Military Commander 
of the Judea and Samaria Region PO 37 [4] 785 [1983] (Isr.), such 
terminology remains politically charged in Israel because of the inflammatory 
dispute over original land ownership from biblical times through the 1967 
Six-Day War. 
The legal debate over "occupation" is, however, outside the scope of this 
Paper, which is focused on international water law. A discussion of 
specifically "occupation"-related legal obligations necessarily implicates the 
larger debate over the nature of the conflict, a realm of virtually unlimited 
complexity that I do not enter here. But more importantly, the international 
law of occupation—as codified in provisions like the 4th Geneva Convention 
and Hague Regulations—does not specifically address water rights. 
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treaty ratification or statutory execution for international law to bind its 
government.13 The Israeli High Court of Justice has ruled numerous times, 
most recently in the 2008 Al-Bassiouni v. Prime Minister case, that Israel is 
bound by all customary international law that does not specifically contradict 
domestic statutory provisions.14 All international water law that is both 
customary—that is, generally recognized and practiced by the community of 
nations—and applicable to Israel is, therefore, relevant and binding. 
A. INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW PRE-OSLO 
The Palestinians build their case for water rights in the West Bank upon 
international water law and the 1995 Oslo II Interim Agreement. These 
documents, however, are ultimately of limited utility as each is either legally 
inapplicable, non-binding, or diluted of all meaning. 
The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that 
"everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and 
well-being of himself and of his family."15 In addition to the 1948 
                                                             
13 Cf. Jed Reubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1971 (arguing that the United States practices "democratic 
constitutionalism" rather than "international constitutionalism" in attempting 
to observe international law consistent with our democratic processes, rather 
than transnational norms). 
14 See HCJ 9132/07 Jaber Al-Bassiouni v. Prime Minister, [2008] (Isr.), 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/07/320/091/n25/07091320.n25.htm; see 
also HCJ 606/78 Ayoub v. Minister of Defense 38(2) PD I 13 (Beth El case) 
[2000] (Isr.); HCJ 393/82 Teachers' Housing Cooperative Society v. The 
Military Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region PO 37 [4] 785 [1983] 
(Isr.) (affirming the proposition that customary international law is 
automatically inducted into Israeli domestic law unless a specific statute or 
basic law contradicts it). 
15 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III)A, at 75, 
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
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Declaration, the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) also implicitly incline toward a human right to water.16 In 
2003, the U.N. Economic and Social Council recently made the right explicit: 
"The human right to water is indispensable for leading a life of human 
dignity. It is a prerequisite for the realization of other human rights."17 These 
abstract proclamations have never been understood to impose obligations on 
countries,18 however, and the current Palestinian position grounds its 
allegations of Israeli legal violations on more substantive, specific 
documents. 
Among these documents are The Helsinki Rules ("the Rules"), which 
were drafted by the International Law Association ("ILA") in 1966, and 
offered the first comprehensive expression of equitable utilization water 
doctrine. In relevant part, the Rules state that "each basin State is entitled, 
within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses 
of the waters of an international drainage basin," and thereafter, proceed to 
enumerate an extensive list of factors to be considered in defining what 
constitutes "a reasonable and equitable share"—these include geography, 
                                                             
16 See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. See also IGNACIO J. ALVAREZ, The 
Right to Water as a Human Right, in LINKING HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 71, 72 (Romina Picolotti & Jorge Daniel Taillant eds., 2003) 
(discussing the absence of specific mention of the right to water in the 
ICCPR, ICESCR, and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights). 
17 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. & 
Cultural Rights, Nov. 11–Nov. 19, 2002, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11, General 
Comment No. 15, art. 11, at 1 (Jan. 20, 2003). 
18 See, e.g., Stephen C. McCaffrey, A Human Right to Water: Domestic 
and International Implications, 5 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1992). 
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hydrology, climate, past utilization, economic and social needs, dependent 
population, avoidance of waste, and the availability of other resources.19 
If the list of relevant factors did not create enough opportunity for 
disagreement on their own, Article Five ensures that the Rules can be shaped 
to support virtually any position by any basin state. It provides that "the 
weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its importance in 
comparison with that of the other relevant factors."20 These balancing 
addenda virtually eviscerate any possibility for bright-line enforcement, and 
guarantee that either party in a dispute will shape the Rules' amorphous 
language in their favor.21 The Helsinki Rules thus constitute an interpretive 
nightmare: they beg the outcome-determinative question, and create 
arguments, rather than resolving disputes. 
In an effort to codify the principles outlined in Helsinki as binding 
international water law, the U.N. drafted the Convention on the Law of Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses in 1997. The Convention 
drew heavily upon Helsinki's factors in determining equitable utilization; 
materially deviating only to add an important clause on optimal utilization, 
whereby riparian states must achieve the optimal use of the watercourse as if 
no State boundaries existed.22 
                                                             
19 See INT'L LAW ASS'N (ILA), HELSINKI RULES ON THE USES OF THE 
WATERS OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS 1 (1966), available at 
http://webworld.unesco.org/water/wwap/pccp/cd/pdf/educational_tools/cours
e_modules/reference_documents/internationalregionconventions/helsinkirule
s.pdf [hereinafter HELSINKI]. 
20 Id. at 2. 
21 For a discussion of the notorious difficulty of enforcing laundry lists 
of affirmative rights as operational rules, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, Against 
Positive Rights, in WESTERN RIGHTS? POST-COMMUNIST APPLICATION (A. 
Sajo ed., 1996). 
22 See Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, May 21, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 700 (1997), available at http:// 
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Palestinians and human rights activists have repeatedly cited these 
provisions as defining customary international water law, indicting Israel's 
allegedly inequitable practices.23 For example, Gamal Abouli, who served as 
legal advisor to the Palestine Liberation Organization ("PLO") during its 
2000 Camp David Summit negotiations with Israel, wrote extensively on the 
importance of the Helsinki Rules and Convention to the Israeli-Palestinian 
water dispute. In his oft-cited article, Natural Resources Under Occupation: 
The Status of Palestinian Water Under International Law, Abouli writes that 
Israel's "lopsided use of shared resources [is] inequitable under evolving 
norms of international transboundary water law," and, referring to Helsinki 
and the Convention, that "participants in the current process of negotiations 
should heed these prescriptions."24 
This international water law is problematic for a number of reasons. 
First, neither the Helsinki Rules nor the Convention constitute binding 
customary international law; only sixteen countries (which do not include 
Israel) have ratified the Convention worldwide, and Helsinki has no 
enforceability as a treaty due to the ILA's unofficial status.25 Second, the two 
                                                                                                                              
untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_3_1997.pdf 
[hereinafter Convention]. 
23 See, e.g., SHARIF ELMUSA, WATER CONFLICT: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, 
LAW AND PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI WATER RESOURCES 306 (Institute for 
Palestine Studies, Washington, DC 1997); B'TSELEM POSITION PAPER, supra 
note 3, at 73; Philip Baumgarten, Israel's Transboundary Water Disputes, 30 
J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 179, 190–95 (2010). 
24 Gamal Abouli, Natural Resources Under Occupation: The Status of 
Palestinian Water Under International Law, 10 PACE INT'L L. REV. 411, 
573–74 (1998). 
25 J.W. Dellapenna, The Customary International Law of Transboundary 
Fresh Waters, 1 INT. J. GLOBAL ENVTL. ISSUES 264, 273 (2001) (recognizing 
that, while the ILA is "a highly regarded non-governmental association of 
legal experts," it nevertheless has "no legal standing as [a] lawgiver"). Cf. Ian 
J. Silverbrand, Israeli-Palestinian Water Literature's Misplaced Dependence 
upon Customary International Law, 37 ENVTL L. REV. 603, 614 (2007). 
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documents appear to not include relations between nations and non-state 
populations like the Palestinians. For example, the Helsinki Rules apply to 
"the use of waters in an international drainage basin," defined as 
"geographical area[s] extending over two or more States," and consistently 
refers to "each basin state."26 The Convention likewise refers exclusively to 
"international watercourse[s], [defined as] a watercourse, parts of which are 
situated in different states."27 Many argue that Israel's non-state argument is a 
technicality-waving delay tactic that fails to appreciate the imminent 
sovereignty of a future Palestinian state.28 From Israel's perspective, 
Palestinian statehood is anything but imminent and any Israeli concession 
that can be interpreted to imply Palestinian sovereignty before Final Status 
Talks is politically perilous.29 
Perhaps more fundamentally, international water law, and the 
Convention and Helsinki Rules in particular, likely does not apply to 
subterranean groundwater chambers like the West Bank aquifer. The Helsinki 
Rules refer to surface basins, and the Convention only applies to aquifers if 
they are part of a "system of surface waters and groundwaters constituting . . . 
a unitary whole . . . flowing into a common terminus."30 
Mr. Abouli's argument that the Convention still holds because an aquifer 
can be considered as an "underground terminus of waters from precipitation 
                                                             
26 HELSINKI, supra note 19, art. I; see, e.g., id. at art. IV. 
27 Convention, supra note 22, art. II(b). 
28 See, e.g., Baumgarten, supra note 23, at 196. 
29 When Israel first recognized the Palestinian right to water in the Oslo 
II Agreement (soon to be discussed), the Israeli press warned that "by the 
explicit recognition of Palestinian water rights Israel has opened . . . a 
Pandora's Box and created the most dangerous precedent in her history." 
MARTIN SHERMAN, THE POLITICS OF WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST: AN 
ISRAELI PERSPECTIVE ON THE HYDRO-POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE CONFLICT 
100 (1999). 
30 Convention, supra note 22, at art. 2(a). 
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and seasonal rivers"31 ignores the fundamental hydrology of the West Bank 
Aquifer. It not only flows into three divergent termini and has "no physical 
relationship with any surface body of water, and is, in fact, unrelated to any 
other identifiable water resource."32 This is not a mere loophole in the 
Convention, but rather, reflects the difficulties in legally applying equitable 
utilization principles to confined groundwater resources. Technical 
knowledge about aquifers is more recent and controversial than that of 
surface water resources, pollution is a much greater risk with groundwater, 
and much of the hydrological science is unknown, like flowing patterns, 
permeability, and soil-water connections.33 For example, some Israelis insist 
that the ideal well-sites for accessing the western sub-basins of the Mountain 
Aquifer are in Israel because the chambers are closer to the surface and can 
be tapped by shallow wells, thus allowing for fresher extraction34—a 
scientific metric which would leave the Palestinians with no legal right to 
divert such waters out of Israeli territory without government consent.35 
Even apart from questions surrounding its binding effect and its 
applicability, the principal deficiency of international water law is that it 
appears incapable on its face of resolving anything. The relative weight 
granted to each of the laundry list of "equitable utilization" criteria depends 
entirely on the interpreter, effectively relocating the dispute to the question of 
which factor should govern. The Israelis cite the "past and existing 
utilization" factor to emphasize their extensive development of the region's 
resources since the beginnings of the Zionist movement; the "economic and 
social needs" factor because of Israel's far greater economic activity; "the 
availability of other resources" and "avoidance of waste" factors to point out 
the sophisticated efficiency with which Mekorot distributes water within 
                                                             
31 Abouli, supra note 24, at 540. 
32 Silverbrand, supra note 25, at 623. 
33 See Elver, supra note 1, at 439. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
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Israel compared to woeful Palestinian infrastructure.36 The Palestinians, for 
their part, emphasize the "geography," "dependent population," and 
"substantial injury" factors as advantageous to their position, and retort with 
understandable exasperation that Israel can only cite their economic 
efficiency-based criteria because their inequitable water use has nourished 
socio-economic growth at the Palestinians' expense.37 
One might well argue that Israel should simply elect to embrace these 
two documents, loopholes and all, as a matter of principled policy because it 
is the right thing to do, legalistic formalism be damned. Indeed, this article 
argues later that it is in Israel's interest for the Palestinians to have access to 
sufficient water resources. Palestinian frustrations with "inapplicability to 
non-state actors" and "underwater aquifer exception" arguments are 
understandable. But exasperation over technicalities misses the point: the 
Convention and Helsinki Rules are not just toothless, inapposite legal 
instruments that the Palestinians should not rely on for a "water rights" 
argument, they are also terribly useless from a political perspective. The 
abstraction with which these two documents seek to plug all the holes of 
water conflict render them utterly unhelpful from a practical standpoint of 
dispute resolution. They would credibly resolve nothing. Even Sharif Elmusa, 
one of the most vocal and articulate advocates of Palestinian water rights, 
acknowledges that different parameters to be considered in equitable 
utilization "may be faulted for being too numerous and stated in too general a 
                                                             
36 Id. at 436–41. 
37 Id. at 440. See ELMUSA, supra note 23, at 311. For an empirical 
discussion of how multi-factor legal decision-making precludes consistent, 
impartial application, see Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the 
Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581 
(2006). Beebe found that, in applying the multi-factor trademark litigation 
tests meant to determine the likelihood of consumer confusion, judges from 
the thirteen circuit courts would discriminately pick and choose which factors 
to weight heavily, and "stampede" the remaining factors in order to conform 
to a preferred outcome. Id. at 1581–82. 
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fashion to be useful for negotiations."38 Mr. Elmusa is far too generous. As an 
idiosyncratic conflict, the Israeli-Palestinian water debate has always required 
something a bit more customized. 
B. OSLO II 
In September 1995, the Israelis and Palestinians signed an agreement 
governing water rights for the first time. The Oslo II accords included an 
Annex III, Article 40 addressing the issues of water and sewage management. 
Compared to the Helsinki Rules, the accords are admirably concrete. The 
agreement has proved unworkable in the long run, but it was never intended 
to serve as anything but a temporary provision. The disputes left unresolved 
by Oslo II have been exacerbated, in part, by the fact that Oslo II undermined 
its own limited authority with the promise of Final Status Negotiations that 
have yet to take place. 
The Interim Agreement was unprecedented in its statement that "Israel 
recognizes the Palestinian water rights in the West Bank," but neutered by the 
following sentence: "These will be negotiated in the permanent status 
negotiations and settled in the Permanent Status Agreement relating to the 
various water resources."39 Nevertheless, despite arising under the title 
"Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement," Oslo II's water article lays out 
specific metrics for Palestinian future water needs, as well as obligations for 
both parties. 
Oslo II articulated that the West Bank Palestinians required water 
quantities of 70-80 MCM/yr, which meant that supplies must be increased by 
20%, or 23.6 MCM/yr, either by new wells or Israeli allocation.40 In addition, 
the Interim Agreement acknowledged the water shortage on both sides, and 
the imperative of developing additional sources of water—from the Eastern 
Aquifer sub-basin, as well as recycling from wastewater treatment and 
                                                             
38 Id. at 307. 
39 Oslo II, supra note 8, at art. 40, cl. 1. 
40 See id. cl. 6. 
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desalination.41 It further prohibited any activities that would lead to pollution 
of the environment, and compelled proper wastewater treatment 
responsibilities.42 
In addition, the Interim Agreement established the framework for the 
formation of a Joint Water Committee (JWC) of both Israelis and Palestinians 
to implement its terms and "deal with all water and sewage related issues in 
the West Bank."43 Since Oslo II, the JWC has continued to meet and function 
despite the multiple outbreaks of violence, including the brutal Al-Aqsa 
Intifada of 2000, while "nearly all the other Oslo mechanisms have ground to 
a halt."44 
Both sides have resorted to charging the other party with rampant 
violations of Oslo II. This legal crossfire is a result of inappropriately treating 
Oslo II as a permanent accord rather than the stop-gap truce it was intended to 
be. The Palestinians claim Israel has refused to meet their water needs, 
engaged in discriminatory pricing, and used its control over the JWC to 
repeatedly deny Palestinian requests for licenses to drill wells over the 
Aquifer. 
These accusations have varying degrees of merit. First, Israel has 
technically met its Oslo II metrics; water supply to the West Bank has 
increased by 50%, or an additional 60 MCM/yr—22 million supplied by 
Israel directly and 40 MCM more from ninety new wells approved by the 
JWC—far more than the 20% increase of 23.6 MCM/yr mandated.45 But the 
reality is that West Bank water supply is utterly insufficient, both because the 
                                                             
41 Id. cl. 2–3. 
42 Id. cl. 3. 
43 Id. cl. 11–12. 
44 Silverbrand, supra note 25, at 620. 
45 See, e.g., IWA REPORT, supra note 9, at 6–7; Tal, supra note 10, at 
62. 
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original PLO-negotiated allocation was and is "abysmally low,"46 and as a 
result of Palestinian demographic trends. The West Bank population has 
roughly tripled in the last two decades, with the population currently 
estimated at 2.46 million, with a growth rate of 2.1 percent per year.47 The 
calculus of "future Palestinian water needs" has exploded since Oslo II was 
drafted, thus exposing the Agreement's limitations as a temporary document 
forced to carry water beyond its service date. 
The Palestinian complaint of discriminatory pricing appears valid on its 
face, although the Oslo II framework does not speak to pricing 
comprehensively. Palestinians can effectively pay as much as six times more 
than Israeli settlers in the West Bank per water unit.48 Israelis assert that this 
discrepancy is incidental, due to generally applicable agricultural subsidies to 
farmers (most Israeli settlers are agricultural) and the inefficient infrastructure 
of Palestinian Water Authority transport.49 Although the PWA purchases 
water from Mekorot at a price equal to Israelis (before agricultural subsidies), 
Palestinian municipalities will often charge an elevated price for 
distribution.50 There is reason to believe that annual water price increases in 
cities like Ramallah are due almost entirely to wasteful Palestinian 
administration policies.51 Israelis also point out that the JWC's price-setting 
collaboration with Mekorot is legitimated by the fact that the JWC is a 
creature of Oslo II.52 
                                                             
46 Silverbrand, supra note 25, at 620. 
47 In 1989, only 860,000 Palestinians lived in the West Bank. See, e.g., 
Tal, supra note 10, at 64. 
48 See Elver, supra note 1, at 427. 
49 See id. at 427–28. 
50 See, e.g., Hadeel Wahdan, Who's Gauging the Water Flow?, MIDDLE 
EAST NEWS ONLINE, Feb. 23, 2000. 
51 Id. 
52 See, e.g., Baumgarten, supra note 23, at 189. 
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Still, Palestinians argue that the JWC is, in reality, not a jointly managed 
committee, but an Israeli-dominated entity that has merely formalized 
discriminatory practices, and consistently refuses to grant licenses for 
Palestinian aquifer infrastructure construction.53 Close scrutiny of the 
Committee's minutes reveals a more complicated reality: the JWC 
Hydrological Committee has approved the drilling of seventy new water 
wells and twenty-two observation wells for the West Bank Palestinians in the 
eastern sub-basin (of which only half have been implemented), the Water 
Works committee has approved more than twenty reservoirs and pumping 
stations, and the Sewage Committee has approved numerous wastewater 
treatment plants in all major Palestinian cities, to be funded by donor 
countries, only one of which has been constructed in El-Bireh.54 
Nevertheless, the water needs of Palestinians are not being met, and they 
have some legitimate legal grievances. Israel has not adequately policed 
Mekorot pricing, and the Joint Water Committee might well be capable of 
granting more Palestinian well licenses. However, these claims can be 
attributed, in part, to Olso II's deficiencies. The Interim Agreement is 
nowhere close to sufficiently exhaustive when it comes to pricing, joint 
management, and public policy issues (like government subsidies)—and for 
good reason: the Interim Period was originally determined to extend no more 
than five years from its signing.55 It cannot possibly account for recent 
demographic, political, and environmental contingencies like droughts and 
population growth and has not been filled in by Final Status talks in 16 years. 
Much the same can be said of Israel's accusations of Palestinian 
violations. Israel alleges that Palestinians are drilling illegal wells outside the 
Interim Agreement's parameters. Since the signing of Oslo II, more than 250 
"unapproved" wells have been drilled—mostly in the northern basin in the 
area of Jenin and the western basin near Qaqilya and Tulkram—from which 
                                                             
53 Id. 
54 IWA REPORT, supra note 9, at 5. 
55 Id. at 6. 
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the Palestinians are extracting about 10 MCM/yr.56 The Agreement, however, 
states in § 7(b)(6) that the additional 28.6 MCM/yr earmarked for "future 
Palestinian needs" "shall be developed by the Palestinians from the Eastern 
Aquifer and other agreed sources in the West Bank,"57 yet the JWC has failed 
to approve these illegal wells. 
Additionally, West Bank Palestinians have adopted the recent practice 
of attaching unauthorized "pirate" connections to Mekorot water supply 
pipelines.58 Israel has reported water shortages in Hebron, Kiryat Arba, Bani 
Naim, and other outposts, allegedly caused by water theft by inhabitants of 
the Sair and Shuyukh villages for irrigating fields along the fringes of the 
Judean desert.59 The aqua-piracy, estimated at about 3.5 MCM/yr, has forced 
Israel to lay new pipelines across the West Bank.60 
These difficulties all ultimately reflect the extent to which Oslo II has 
out-lived its welcome. As the West Bank population has out-raced Oslo's 
obsolete water metrics, Israel's technically legal compliance has translated to 
dwindling Palestinian per-capita consumption.61 This has led to 
understandable acts of desperation. Crowing about successfully approved 
JWC wells (with numerous license requests pending)62 and satisfied 
                                                             
56 Id. at 9–10. 
57 Oslo II, supra note 8, § 7(b)(6). 
58 IWA REPORT, supra note 9, at 11. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 E.g., Elver, supra note 1, at 428. 
62 Exposing Life Under Occupation: West Bank Water Fact Sheet, 
PALESTINE MONITOR, (Dec. 18, 2009), available at http://www 
.palestinemonitor.org/spip/spip.php?article14 (stating that over 140 well 
license requests have been pending for ten years. This statistic is almost 
certainly exaggerated, however, according to most unbiased estimates. See, 
e.g., THE WORLD BANK, MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA REGION 
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benchmarks offer little consolation to West Bank inhabitants when the 
principal purpose of Oslo II's water article—meeting Palestinian water 
needs—has been warped by the swift passage of time. 
Yet water robbers and unlicensed well drilling are not what Israelis find 
most objectionable about Palestinian Oslo compliance.63 When asked to point 
fingers across the diplomatic divide at specific violations—and these parties 
rarely await a request—Israel focuses on Palestinian failures at water 
infrastructure development. Sections Two and Three of the Interim 
Agreement state the responsibility of both parties to make efforts to develop 
alternative water supply sources (like wastewater recycling and desalination) 
and to maximize conservation by reducing inefficient distribution. In an 
interview, Lieutenant Colonel Sharon Davidovich, the Israeli National 
Director of the Jewish National Parsons Water Fund, articulated his side's 
exasperation: "Use foreign donations to build a wastewater treatment or 
desalination plant," he insists, "and I guarantee you, you will never hear 
another Israeli mention the word piracy again."64 
Israel perceives the Palestinian Authority as willfully refusing to 
cooperate on these issues, and thus, failing to meet their §§ 2-3 obligations. 
Palestinian experts themselves acknowledge, for example, that about thirty 
percent of the scarce water allocated to West Bank cities leaks out of poorly 
maintained pipes, despite the availability of technologies that could quickly 
identify and plug such leaks.65 
                                                                                                                              
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, WEST BANK AND GAZA: ASSESSMENT OF 
RESTRICTIONS ON PALESTINIAN WATER SECTOR DEVELOPMENT NO. 47657-
GZ (Apr. 2009) [hereinafter THE WORLD BANK]. 
63 See Interview with Lt. Col. (Res.) Sharon Davidovich, National 
Director, JNF Parsons Water Fund, in New York, N.Y. (Feb. 11, 2011) 
[hereinafter Davidovich Interview]. 
64 Id. 
65 See Ziad Abdeen, Water Culture in Palestine, in WATER WISDOM 67, 
67–70 (Alon Tal & Alfred Abed Rabbo eds., 2010); see also Avi Rabinovich, 
Israeli Firms Aim to Plug World's Water Leaks, REUTERS, Nov. 3, 2009, 
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Nor have the Palestinians endeavored to develop new, alternative water 
sources. Israel has responded to the water crisis by utilizing desalination 
plants, wastewater treatment, and stormwater impoundment to increase its 
overall water supply by about 2,000 MCM/yr.66 Unlike desalinated water, 
recycled wastewater is not usually drinkable; however, wastewater facilities 
can produce irrigation-quality water, thus liberating potable freshwater 
supplies that otherwise would have been siphoned off to agricultural uses. 
Israel has cut the amount of fresh water earmarked for agriculture by half in 
the last decade by increasing the percentage of municipal sewage that is 
treated and used for irrigation by 72%. Sewage treatment therefore presents 
an opportunity to not only protect scarce environmental resources (like 
groundwater) from contamination, but to increase those resources as well. 
With the exception of the treatment plant at El-Bireh, Palestinians have 
not constructed any new desalination or recycling facilities in the last 
decade.67 This has already resulted in cataclysmic environmental hazards. Of 
the roughly 52 MCM/yr of sewage produced by West Bank inhabitants, only 
about 4 MCM/yr is treated by plants, with the rest flowing downhill into 
Israeli and Palestinian soil, a violation of § 3(f) of the Interim Agreement 
(sewage obligations).68 This has converted the Kishon, Alexander-Nablus, 
Modiin, Kidron, and Hebron streams into foul sewage tracts, and 
                                                                                                                              
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/04/us-water-israel-leaks-
idUSTRE5A303X20091104 (describing the readily available technology with 
which countries can retro-fit and modernize their water pipes in order to 
minimize wasteful leakage). 
66 IWA REPORT, supra note 9, at 15. 
67 Id. at 13. Plans for a new $6.2 million wastewater facility in Jenin to 
be jointly managed by the Palestinian Water Authority, Japanese government, 
and U.N. Development program were announced three years ago, but 
construction has appeared to stall. See Palestine: Japan, Palestinian Water 
Authority and UNDP/PAPP Sign a 6.2 Million Dollar Agreement to Manage 
Wastewater, WASH. NEWS, MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA BLOG (Mar. 20, 
2009), https://washmena.wordpress.com/tag/palestinian-water-authority/. 
68 IWA REPORT, supra note 9, at 12. 
J o u r n a l  o f  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  
a n d  P u b l i c  H e a l t h  L a w  
 
 
 
 
 
P a g e  | 219 
 
ISSN 2164-7976 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/pjephl.2013.49 
http://pjephl.law.pitt.edu 
Privatizing Peace 
Spring 2013 
contaminated wells in Bethlehem, the Jordan Valley, and Jerusalem, leading 
to their closure, and thereby exacerbating supply shortages.69 
Lack of Palestinian economic resources cannot account for the 
conspicuous absence of wastewater and desalination plant projects (or, for 
that matter, stalled pipe modernization), as some argue.70 A host of donor 
countries (including Germany, the USA, and Japan as well as the World 
Bank) have expressed their willingness to allocate considerable funds of over 
$300 million per year for facility construction, but the Palestinians have not 
advanced the projects.71 From 2002–2007, of the $130 million of foreign aid 
earmarked for sewerage systems, only $25 million has been invested in the 
El-Bireh plant; the Palestinian Authority has declined foreign funding for 
desalination and sewage treatment facilities in Nablus, Tulkarm, Jenin, Salfit, 
Ramallah, Kidron, Hebron, and other villages.72 This extends to urban 
delivery system neglect: Alon Tal observes, 
Regardless of one's view, even the most avid Palestinian 
advocates would have a hard time making the case that a 
fair share of the prodigious humanitarian assistance has 
been allotted to Palestinian water infrastructure. Despite 
the generosity of the international community, 
investment in improving municipal water delivery has 
been insignificant.73 
So, why on earth is the Palestinian Authority refusing to allocate foreign 
aid to Oslo II water supply goals? The answer, once again, originates with 
                                                             
69 Id. 
70 See, e.g., ELMUSA, supra note 23, at 321 (arguing that economic 
imbalances between Palestinians and Israelis account for the discrepancy in 
alternative water resource development projects). 
71 IWA REPORT, supra note 9, at 14. 
72 Id.; see also Palestine, supra note 67 (reporting on the Palestinian 
Authority's refusal to accept foreign funding). 
73 Tal, supra note 10, at 7. 
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Oslo II's flaws as an ad hoc document of fleeting usefulness. By dangling the 
notion of final status negotiations in the near future, Oslo II de-legitimized its 
own authority, and created an incentive for prospective bargaining tactics. 
The Palestinian Authority views any acceptance of foreign aid for water 
recycling purposes as potentially fraught with invisible strings attached—
namely, that acceptance could be interpreted as a forfeiture of the 
Palestinians' sovereign claim to the entire mountain aquifer.74 Final 
negotiations would surely be sponsored by the U.S. and chaperoned by the 
international community, and Palestinians are wary of weakening their 
position at the proverbial future table—both regarding claims to the 
freshwater sources they believe are theirs and to innumerable other associated 
issues. 
The specter of Final Status Talks increasingly resembles a fading mirage 
in the desert—it wavers on the horizon, and each party sees in it what it 
wishes to see. For the Palestinians, that means refugees, the "right of return," 
final status of Jerusalem, and water sovereignty. "The Palestinians will not 
take funds gift-wrapped for alternative water resource development," Lt. Col. 
Davidovich said, "they view it as a white flag in the aquifer conflict, and 
perhaps not entirely unreasonably."75 
A prime example was the Palestinian Authority's response to a March 
2009 joint Israeli-American offer to donate a portion of land in Hadera for 
building a desalination plant for Palestinian use. The official Palestinian 
Water Authority statement read: "The Palestinian side refuses to resort to 
alternative water supplies, such as desalination, before regaining its rights to 
the water from the aquifers and the River Jordan. Desalination plants do not 
deal with the issue of Palestinian water rights."76 Nor will the Palestinian 
Authority agree to purchase from Israeli desalination plants operating only a 
                                                             
74 See, e.g., id. at 11. 
75 Davidovich Interview, supra note 63. 
76 Palestine, supra note 67. 
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few kilometers away and which produce one thousand liters of crystal-clear 
water for fifty cents.77 "Rights," in other words, are holding "needs" hostage. 
Both parties' alleged Oslo II breaches are symptomatic of the Interim 
Agreement's limitations. This is not to say that the Israelis and Palestinians 
are blameless. Each has probably breached Oslo: the Israelis have been too 
lenient with Mekorot's discriminatory pricing, whatever they say on the 
subject of agricultural subsidies for Jewish settlers, and the Palestinians have 
failed to develop their infrastructure or consistently follow JWC channels 
before drilling illegal wells and pirate connections. 
But Oslo II itself remains the real culprit. It could not account for 
changing demographic, hydrological, and climate trends fifteen years later; it 
left numerous issues purposefully unsettled; and most problematic, it declared 
a nebulous date with a destiny that left both parties scrambling to tactically 
outmaneuver one another and gain future leverage. It thus offers slightly 
more help than the rest of the international water law in providing practical 
solutions. 
The West Bank Palestinians are therefore suspended in a physical and 
diplomatic drought with a deficit of legal authority upon which to state a 
claim. 
In biblical times, this is where God would come in. 
II. PRIVATIZATION AND THE NEW "STAFF OF MOSES" 
In the Bible's Exodus passages, the weary Israelites demand water of 
Moses. But their prophet has no water in his possession to give, and the 
miracle comes from an untapped source. 
In the Middle East, history often (tragically) repeats itself. The Israelis 
do not have sufficient water to satisfy the Palestinians' growing demand. If 
annual precipitation continues to drop, Israel will soon be approaching 
                                                             
77 See Tal, supra note 10, at 11. 
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minimal WHO standard levels of potable drinking water;78 it cannot 
realistically (or politically) be expected to further deprive its citizens of fresh 
water sources before Final Status Talks offer them something in return. Even 
if Israel was willing to do the unthinkable, it would still not be enough; a 
recent study by the Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute projected 
that, if current demographic, economic, and environmental trends continue in 
the region and no new water resources are developed, total regional demand 
for water would be three times the supply by 2020.79 The bottom line is this: 
if Palestinians do not begin investing in retro-fitting urban water delivery, 
desalination plants, and modern sewage infrastructure, all the new allocation 
schemes and legal indictments in the world will not save them from thirst. 
The Palestinians dream of an equitable two-state solution that safeguards 
their water rights in the West Bank; and who can possibly blame them? Yet, 
in hearing only the tempting siren call of Final Status Talks, they sacrifice 
available remedies in the present. So, how can they be convinced to plug their 
own ears with Odyssean wax and sail past such concerns? The challenge is to 
craft a solution to ameliorate the water supply problem while persuading the 
Palestinians that developing alternative water sources will not divest them of 
their future "water rights." The solution may lie in an alternative vehicle to a 
state-run development project: privatization. 
Private sector investment is not accompanied by the same "strings 
attached" paranoia as foreign aid. Even if the Palestinians protest abandoning 
Oslo II's "rights" language, privatization would actually strengthen the 
Palestinians' argument, stripping Israel of its §§ 2–3 "infrastructure clause" 
allegation: The Palestinian Authority would be utilizing private sector 
expertise to minimize inefficiency, develop new supply sources, and manage 
their waste—all without the charity of foreign governments. Moreover, 
expanded privatization would reduce Palestinian dependency on Mekorot 
supply and prices, diffusing tensions in the peace process. 
                                                             
78 See, e.g., Elver, supra note 1, at 427. 
79 See Anan Jayyousi & Fathi Srouji, Future Water Needs in Palestine, 
2009 PALESTINE ECON. POL'Y RES. INST. 49. 
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There is the possibility, of course, that the Palestinians will view 
alternative water source development of any kind as a waiver of aquifer 
sovereignty, regardless of whether the funding comes from private 
investment or foreign aid. This seems unlikely, given the incontrovertibly 
independent self-sufficiency of private sector investment compared to foreign 
donations. Nevertheless, a voluntary stipulation by Israel that any Palestinian 
partnerships with private firms to construct development facilities will not 
affect future rights claims could certainly alleviate any remaining Palestinian 
reservations. The Palestinians willingly signed Oslo II, in part, because of a 
similar stipulation in Article 40's clause 8: "The provisions of paragraphs 6–7 
above shall not prejudice the provisions of paragraph 1 to this Article"—in 
other words, that the established metrics of Palestinian water needs would not 
dilute the previous recognition of their sovereign rights claims.80 It is in the 
interests of both parties to ameliorate the region's water shortages, and Israel 
would likely be more than willing to incentivize Palestinian water 
development.81 
The West Bank's Palestinians can do more than pray to the heavens for 
salvation. They do not require a divine staff to spring water from rock as the 
Israelites did; their key to unlocking life from the seemingly barren 
surrounding terrain may well be the private sector. 
Part II will first summarize the general critique of privatizing an 
essential humanitarian good, like water, and the difficulties recent water 
privatization projects have encountered, then argue that the current 
opportunities in the West Bank outweigh those concerns. It will then explain 
how the Fayyadist state-building in the West Bank has recently established a 
regulatory and economic environment that is amenable to private investment, 
briefly note the legal hurdles to increased privatization in the water sector, 
and then apply the lessons offered by a case study of the private water market 
in Gaza. 
                                                             
80 Oslo II, supra note 8, cl. 8. 
81 See Davidovich Interview, supra note 63. 
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A. THE CHALLENGE 
Critics of water privatization argue that water is a public good and a 
basic human right that cannot be surrendered to private control.82 The concern 
is that private companies have the welfare of their investors at heart, not the 
health of the general population; they will exclusively pursue profits, raise 
prices to unaffordable levels, disregard notions of equity, and reduce access 
to quality water. If these corporations encounter difficulties or if returns are 
insufficient, they may well abandon their project. Thus, because sovereign 
governments are bound by an imperative duty to provide access to water for 
its citizens, deferring to private companies to commoditize a natural resource 
constitutes a per se violation of human rights. So goes the reasonable critique. 
There is no reason, however, that states cannot fulfill their obligations to 
the general population with proper regulation and oversight of any private 
role in water infrastructure. As noted previously, the ICESR is one of the 
documents cited by water rights advocates as outlining a basic human right to 
water. General Comment 15, however, states the following: 
Where water services . . . are operated or controlled by 
third parties, States parties must prevent them from 
compromising equal, affordable, and physical access to 
sufficient, safe and acceptable water. To prevent such 
abuses an effective regulatory system must be 
established, in conformity with the Covenant and this 
General Comment, which includes independent 
                                                             
82 See, e.g., Sarah I. Hale, Water Privatization in the Philippines: The 
Need to Implement the Human Right to Water, 15 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 
765, 765 (2006); Violeta Petrova, At the Frontiers of the Rush for Blue Gold: 
Water Privatization and the Human Rights, 31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 577, 582 
(2006). 
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monitoring, genuine public participation, and imposition 
of penalties for non-compliance.83 
The human rights regime itself, therefore, contemplates the notion of non-
state third parties controlling a state's water supply. Private sector 
involvement in water distribution raises a number of critical challenges, but it 
is difficult to insist that privatization itself is, by definition, a violation of 
water rights. 
The recent record of water projects in the developing world is 
admittedly mixed. The Phillipines' 1997 privatization of Manila's 
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, for example, led to 
skyrocketing prices and a complete failure to provide affordable, clean 
drinking water and sewer services.84 The plan's goal was to expand access to 
all of the city's 11 million residents and streamline municipal efficiency, but it 
failed to deliver meaningful improvements.85 
The privatization disaster in Cochabamba, Bolivia is often cited as the 
prototypical cautionary tale.86 A municipal company, SEMAPA, had 
controlled the water system in Cochabamba before privatization, but only 
provided it to 57% of the population, and the system's inefficiencies lost half 
the water supply in transport leaks.87 Water was rationed and those without 
                                                             
83 ECOSOC, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Substantive 
Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: General Comment No. 15 (2002), 
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003). 
84 Hale, supra note 82, at 768. 
85 Id. 
86 See, e.g., Maria McFarland Sanchez-Moreno & Tracy Higgins, No 
Recourse: Transnational Corporations and the Protection of Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights in Bolivia, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1663, 1725 
(2004). 
87 See Melina Williams, Privatization and the Human Right to Water: 
Challenges for the New Century, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 469, 496–98 (2007). 
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access purchased water from private wells and vendors.88 In 1998, the World 
Bank pressured Bolivia to privatize the system as a condition of a massive 
foreign aid loan.89 The project was awarded to Aguas del Tarini, a 
transnational subsidiary of American company Bechtel. The concession 
agreement mandated an expansion of services but failed to regulate price 
hikes with any specificity beyond the vague command of the system being 
"accessible, fair, and efficient" when dealing with users.90 Aguas del Tarini 
raised rates by 35%, and some citizens reported increases in water prices as 
high as 200%.91 When workers began receiving monthly bills amounting to 
half their total income, the population began to revolt.92 The passionate and, 
at times, violent protests that followed have been termed the "Water War." 
Eventually, the Bolivian government was forced to cancel the concession. 
The developing world landscape is littered with failed water 
privatization projects, but it is no graveyard. There have also been some 
notable triumphs.93 A less than stellar success rate should not dissuade the 
West Bank Palestinians from considering the merits of partial privatization. 
Much distinguishes a potential West Bank private sector effort from the 
fiascos in Bolivia and the Philippines. First, this article is not advocating 
wholesale privatization or "divestiture" of the West Bank Palestinians' water 
supply, which is what most failed development projects have attempted. It 
advocates instead an increased role for the private sector in building 
infrastructure like wastewater and desalination plants, which will, in turn, add 
to the Palestinian water supply. This would look far less like the notorious 
                                                             
88 See Sanchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 86, at 1748. 
89 See Williams, supra note 87, at 496. 
90 See Sanchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 86, at 1756. 
91 Williams, supra note 87, at 497. Also critical is the fact that the 
concession agreement forced Aguas del Tarini to take on all of SEMAPA's 
debt, thus creating a likelihood of escalating prices. Id. 
92 Id. 
93 See infra pp. 228–29. 
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past divestiture failures and more like the kind of "public-private 
partnerships" proposed by world leaders at the Third World Water Forum in 
Kyoto, Japan in 2003.94 
Second, past privatization disasters have turned largely on insufficient 
government regulation,95 a shortcoming that the increasingly robust 
Palestinian Authority government can avoid with proper supervision through 
regulatory frameworks. I will argue in the following sections that the current 
economic and political environment in the West Bank presents an 
unprecedented opportunity for successful private sector investment in water 
development, and that recent water experiments in Gaza and Israel's Middle 
Eastern neighbors may prove instructive for the West Bank. 
Perhaps most importantly, the Palestinians are already dependent on the 
prices of an Israeli water company, Mekorot, and the region's total water 
supply is unsustainable. Pursuant to the state regulatory obligations outlined 
in the ICESR's General Comment 15, private sector recruitment is the best 
option for increasing Palestinian control over their water destiny. 
B. THE MOMENT 
"I have to admit, we, the private sector, have changed. 
The mood used to be all the time to complain and say 
there is nothing we can do. And then the politicians were 
trying to create this atmosphere of resistance—no 
development under occupation. Now, Fayyad and his 
boss, President Mahmoud Abbas, changed that. Now the 
mood, said Hulileh, is that improving the Palestinian 
economy "is what will enable you to resist and be 
                                                             
94 See Third World Water Forum, Mar. 22–23, 2003, Kyoto, Japan, 
Ministerial Declaration: Message from the Lake Biwa and Yodo River Basin, 
para. 6 (Mar. 23, 2003), http://www.un-documents.net/a57-785x.htm 
[hereinafter Ministerial Declaration]. 
95 See Hale, supra note 82, at 768; Petrova, supra note 82, at 587; 
Williams, supra note 87, at 499. 
J o u r n a l  o f  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  
a n d  P u b l i c  H e a l t h  L a w  
 
 
 
 
 
P a g e  | 228 
 
ISSN 2164-7976 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/pjephl.2013.49 
http://pjephl.law.pitt.edu 
Volume 7 Issue 2 
Spring 2013 
steadfast. Fayyad said to us: 'You, the business 
community, are not responsible for ending occupation. 
You are responsible for employing people and getting 
ready for the state. And that means you have to be part of 
the global world, to export and import, so when the state 
will come you will not have a garbage yard. You will be 
ready.' " Samir Ulileh, CEO of Palestine Development 
and Investment, which owns the Al-Quds Index.96  
The traditional reasons private sector investment in the Palestinian 
territories has been viewed as unattractive are risk and economic 
underdevelopment. Instability, governmental non-transparency, and a lack of 
access to capital do not make for a happy investor. As long as Israeli security 
unpredictably restricted movement, capital flow was dubious, and 
institutional corruption remained systemic, an increased private sector role in 
water infrastructure development in the West Bank seemed out of the 
question. In 1997, Sharif Elmusa captured the conventional wisdom, writing 
that private contracting to build water recycling facilities was "precluded for 
the foreseeable future."97 
That was the case under Yasser Arafat's Fatah-led Palestinian 
government, which is no longer the case today, thanks to what some have 
labeled "Fayyadism." This emerging philosophy refers to the leadership of 
Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, a former World Bank 
economist, who, in collaboration with his boss, President Mahmoud Abbas, 
has emphasized bottom-up state building in the West Bank over violent and 
rhetorical resistance to Israeli occupation. The theory is that if Palestinians 
can build a real economy, a professional security force, and an effective, 
                                                             
96 Thomas Friedman, The Real Palestinian Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 29, 2010. 
97 ELMUSA, supra note 23, at 323. See also Elver, supra note 1, at 427 
(stating that West Bank Palestinians "lacks the financial means for new 
investment and the necessary institutions to impose good management to 
ensure that the best use is made of limited water resources"). 
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transparent government bureaucracy, it will eventually leave the Israelis no 
choice but to formally recognize a de facto Palestinian state. 
The strategic shift has begun to pay dividends. With annual outbreaks of 
violence continuing to decrease since the last Intifada, senior Israeli military 
officials have acknowledged that Fayyad's trained security forces are "the real 
deal."98 The approval is not merely symbolic; Israel has relaxed its check-
point restrictions and road-blocks within the West Bank, which has led to an 
increased flow of investment and commerce.99 The Palestinian economy grew 
by a resounding 9% last year, the Al-Quds Index (Palestinian Securities 
Exchange) increased by 18%, and wages are skyrocketing.100 
In its September 2010 report, the IMF attributed the West Bank's newly 
flourishing economy to a number of factors beyond improved security. It 
praised aggressive financial sector reforms implemented by the P.A., which 
brought territory banks into line with international lending standards and 
established a modern credit-scoring system to facilitate borrowing.101 On the 
fiscal side, The Palestinian Authority cut public payrolls and subsidy 
spending, allowing it to decrease dependence on foreign aid—from Europe, 
                                                             
98 Friedman, supra note 96. 
99 See Charles Levinson, IMF: Palestinian Economy Is Growing, WALL 
ST. J., Sept. 13, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487046 
21204575487753108024146.html. 
100 See Michael Oren, The West Bank Serves as Model of Prosperity, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297 
0203863204574348292035667088.html. 
101 Staff Report for the Mtg. of the Ad Hoc Liaison Comm. Int'l 
Monetary Fund, Macroeconomic and Fiscal Framework for the West Bank 
and Gaza: Sixth Review of Progress, at 3 (N.Y.: Sept. 21, 2010) http:// 
www.imf.org/external/country/WBG/RR/2010/092110.pdf [hereinafter IMF 
Report]. 
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the U.S. and Arab countries—from $1.8 billion in 2008 to $1.2 billion in 
2010.102 
Of particular interest to utility privatization prospects is the P.A.'s 
gradual phasing-out of electricity subsidies by transferring distribution from 
municipalities to private companies. In early 2010, the P.A. sold the city of 
Nablus' electrical utilities to the Northern Electricity Distribution Company 
(NEDCO), which promptly installed about 170,000 pre-paid meters to 
improve bill payment.103 Thus far, the move appears to have been both 
fiscally efficient and beneficial to consumers.104 
But potentially most advantageous for prospective water investors are 
the new regulations the P.A. and IMF have been preparing. The New 
Companies Law removes bureaucratic red tape for infant companies. The 
New Investment Law and New Industry Law both, in the IMF's words, 
"ensure a fair treatment of private companies independently of the sector of 
operation," And the Movable Assets Law facilitates access to finance by 
enabling the use of movable assets as collateral.105 
Other legal hurdles to altering the public-private balance of water 
administration would ultimately be negligible, given the reality of West Bank 
politics. Regarding possible foreign investment, the Palestinian Authority's 
1998 Law on the Encouragement of Investment in Palestine is rather 
accommodating: rife with incentives like customs and income tax breaks,106 it 
also prohibits national seizure and expropriation except in extraordinary 
                                                             
102 Id. at 24. 
103 Id. at 20. 
104 Id. 
105 Each of these provisions are currently awaiting President Abbas's 
signature. Id. at 21. 
106 Palestinian National Authority, Law on the Encouragement of 
Investment in Palestine, L. No. 1, art. 22 (1998), available at http://www.pic-
palestine.ps/userfiles/file/pdfs/invest_law_e.pdf. 
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circumstances.107 Although water is not one of the specially protected public 
sectors in Article 4, Article 3 provides that "any investor may invest in any 
sector of the Palestinian economy, unless it contravenes other laws."108 This, 
as one might guess, implicates the 2002 Public Water Law No. 3, which 
establishes all water in the Palestinian territories as public property and grants 
the Palestinian Authority exclusive control over its supply, management, and 
distribution.109 
At first blush, The 2002 Public Water Law would appear to fatally clog 
the private investor's faucets. Fortunately, this is not the case for a number of 
reasons. First, as this article has argued, the most critical contribution the 
private sector could make to water management in the West Bank is the 
construction and management of alternative supply facilities, such as 
wastewater treatment and desalination plants. Modernization of existing 
infrastructure so as to minimize leaks, while important, does not offer the 
same potential for a dramatic increase in supply. In this context, it is entirely 
possible that the Palestinian Authority would choose not to interpret such 
activity as privatization per se—meaning the transferred ownership of the 
West Bank's existing water resources—but rather, construction contracts to 
produce a new supply for state-regulated distribution. Even if the P.A. does 
not so interpret the Public Law, this very year the newly Fayyadist P.A. 
government did not hesitate to transfer control of its electrical utilities to a 
private company in order to cut subsidies and maximize efficiency. If, in 
order to increase the Palestinians' water supply, it takes the repeal of a 
legislative act rather than approval of the Council of Ministers—as it did for 
electrical distribution, under LEIP, art. 4—that may well be the course of 
Fayyad and Abbas. It is nonetheless an existing obstacle. 
                                                             
107 Id. art. 7. 
108 Id. arts. 3, 4. 
109 Palestinian National Authority, Water Law No. 3, art. 3 (2002), 
available at http://www.pwa.ps/Portals/_PWA/water%20law3-2002.pdf. 
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C. A GAZA CASE STUDY: LESSONS AND OPPORTUNITIES 
This article has thus argued for the necessity of developing alternative 
water sources in the West Bank and the unprecedented, political and 
economic feasibility of private investment in West Bank water production. 
This section will briefly turn to the question of practicability of private sector 
development of alternative sources. 
Can wastewater and desalination plant contractors turn a profit 
producing high-quality, recycled water in the West Bank while keeping prices 
reasonable? Lt. Col. Sharon Davidovich believes it is possible: "I think that, 
given the governing climate emerging under Fayyad, the question now 
becomes whether the P.A. can engage in a productive partnership with private 
firms to balance consumer welfare with private incentives. Look at our fellow 
Middle Eastern countries. Look at Gaza. It can be done."110 
The recent experiences of the West Bank Palestinians' regional 
neighbors suggest an array of different public-private policy options. In 
Amman, Jordan, service quality improved considerably under a four-year 
wastewater management contract awarded in 1999 to a consortium led by 
Suez Lyonnaise des Eanx.111 The Jordanian government contributed minor 
subsidies in order to keep prices stable, while harnessing private sector 
expertise to streamline efficiency.112 Abu Dhabi has taken a slightly different 
route: it contracted the private IWPP water and power company to build it a 
state-of-the-art water plant in 1998, provided minor subsidies for a few years 
while IWPP managed production, then bought back control; it now uses the 
plant technology to provide clean water to locals for almost nothing.113 
                                                             
110 Davidovich Interview, supra note 63. 
111 Digby Lidstone, To the Last Drop: Private Sector Expertise Can 
Provide a Solution to Some of the Problems Facing the Middle East Water 
Sector, MIDDLE E. ECON. DIG., Aug. 27, 2004. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
J o u r n a l  o f  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  
a n d  P u b l i c  H e a l t h  L a w  
 
 
 
 
 
P a g e  | 233 
 
ISSN 2164-7976 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/pjephl.2013.49 
http://pjephl.law.pitt.edu 
Privatizing Peace 
Spring 2013 
But the closest analogue to the West Bank is the other Palestinian 
territory, the seaside Gaza Strip. In the 1990s, potable water quality and 
availability in Gaza was dreadful. The 1.3 million inhabitants were wholly 
dependent on the coastal aquifer, a groundwater chamber comparable to the 
West Bank's mountain counterpart, quickly overdrew the reserve.114 
At first, market solutions encountered difficulties. In 1998, a UK 
company, Acqua, invested in a project to build a small desalination plant of 
200 cubic meters a day to provide water to Shejaia, an East Gaza City 
governorate.115 At 78 cents per jerry can, which is approximately 20 liters, 
most poor households could not afford the water.116 Further, by 2000, the 
overdrawn aquifer was providing undrinkable water with ultra-high 
salinity.117 Soon, however, an active entrepreneurial private sector responded 
by recruiting micro-financers to install "reverse-osmosis" (RO) desalination 
units in household kitchens for about 300 dollars each, filtering out the 
dangerous nitrates from the aquifer water.118 According to the World Bank, 
Gaza's private sector supplied over 100,000 households with RO plants.119 
Over the next few years, many commercial desalination plants have 
been built in Gaza for investment costs of between $20,000 and $40,000, 
most of which private investors covered with their own resources, rather than 
with bank loans.120 These plants have reached the poor households that could 
not afford the RO plants.121 In this new system, 200 liter polyethylene tanks 
                                                             
114 See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 62, at 118. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 119. 
120 Id. 
121 R. El Sheikh, Regulatory Challenges of Palestinian Strategies on 
Distribution of Desalinated Water, 165 ESLEVIER B.V. 84, Feb. 23, 2004. 
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are filled by a tanker once a week and transported to households, which pay 
about 15 cents per jerry can—above the public prices, but far less than 
Acqua's original rates.122 Private investors have helped increase the number 
of Gazans with access to water, and reportedly made a profit doing it.123 The 
World Bank calls the desalination plants a "viable commercial market with 
further growth potential;" they are generally considered to be an "affordable, 
self-sufficient, and sustainable way to supply water to Gaza's citizens."124 
Gaza's private water sector activity, however, is not perfect. First, lack 
of regulatory oversight by Hamas (the Palestinian ruling party in Gaza) has 
led to lowered water quality standards.125 Without sufficient monitoring, 
recycled water can be dangerous; the commercial desalination plants in Gaza 
produce water with lower levels of healthy minerals than the public water 
supply, and experts contend that lax regulation is part of the reason investors 
have been financially successful.126 Second, the energy costs accompanying 
desalination industry have been extensive. For the commercial desalination 
plants, about 60% of costs cover energy; for households, installation of RO 
desalination units can push up monthly electrical bills by 25%.127 The World 
Bank has advocated the construction of a Gaza power plant to alleviate the 
problem.128 
The West Bank can appropriate the best of Gaza's experiment and 
address its deficiencies. First, unlike Gaza, the West Bank is land-locked; 
private investors would therefore have to install brackish water plants (and 
units) to desalinate the eastern aquifer water at the chamber's edges that is 
                                                             
122 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 62, at 119. 
123 Id. at 118. 
124 Id. at 119. 
125 See, e.g., Sheikh, supra note 121. 
126 See, e.g., id. 
127 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 62. 
128 Id. 
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otherwise too mineral-heavy for drinking. The technology costs of both this 
process and wastewater treatment is cheaper than the seawater-desalination in 
Gaza: wastewater treatment costs about 60 cents per cubic meter, while 
brackish desalination is approximately 70 cents per cubic meter and saltwater 
desalination roughly $1.50 per cubic meter.129 This should lower production 
costs and suppress prices. 
Second, the West Bank's electrical utility privatization has already 
lowered energy prices and streamlined efficiency in multiple municipalities, 
and the P.A. plans to extend the ownership transfer to the rest of the 
territory.130 An extension may well alleviate the energy price escalation that 
has plagued Gaza's water production. Finally, the Palestinian Authority has 
earned credibility in recent years at issuing tough regulations across multiple 
sectors.131 The West Bank P.A. must not carelessly issue licenses to new 
plants without continuously monitoring mineral levels in the brackish and 
wastewater recycled product. In so doing, the West Bank can replicate Gaza's 
successes while averting its regulatory failure. 
CONCLUSION 
Any Middle Eastern government might balk at the notion of privatizing 
its water supply, even if the privatization is partial. There is no shortage of 
developing countries that have suffered the potential perils of water 
privatization disasters. Although inhabitants of Ramallah, Bethlehem, and 
Hebron have long known that, where water is concerned, "the private sector 
is the key to better services,"132 hesitancy about surrendering control of a 
scarce resource is understandable. 
                                                             
129 ELMUSA, supra note 23, at 322. 
130 IMF Report, supra note 101. 
131 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 96. 
132 Lidstone, supra note 111. 
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This article, however, has argued that the water scarcity in the West 
Bank is the very reason why private sector involvement may be the best 
option for the future. International water law, including Oslo II, has proved 
inadequate at addressing the needs of the West Bank Palestinians. Even if the 
P.A. were able to extract massive, unrealistic allocations from Israel's water 
supply, alternative resource development would still be imperative, given 
demographic and environmental trends. 
As long as Final Status Negotiations linger on the horizon, the 
Palestinians are intent on focusing the water debate on sovereign rights, 
rather than humanitarian needs. They view foreign donations offering funding 
for development facilities as Trojan Horses stuffed with rights waivers. This 
Catch-22 leaves the P.A. stranded, without help from the law, and without 
help from abroad. 
But the Palestinians can help themselves. Private sector recruitment 
offers a way to sidestep foreign aid's attached strings (real or imagined) and 
reduce tensions with Israel over allocation. Not only could (partial) 
privatization increase the West Bank's water supply by treating wastewater 
for agricultural use and desalinated water for domestic use, it would also 
undercut Israel's Oslo argument that the Palestinians are violating their 
obligations to optimize water system efficiencies and treat sewage. 
The anxiety that privatizing water management would sacrifice control 
over a critical public good and create a national security risk has it 
backwards: Contracting with private investors to build alternative water 
sources would buttress Palestinians' control over their destiny, not destabilize 
it. Today, the West Bank Palestinians are wholly dependent on Israeli 
Mekorot prices and wasteful municipal administration, and drought forecasts 
and population growth have them on a calamitous humanitarian crash course. 
As is, it would be difficult for Palestinians to have less control over their 
water supply than they currently enjoy. 
Moreover, the current political and economic environment is as ripe as 
ever for private investment in the West Bank. Fayyadism has re-calibrated 
notions of Palestinian state-building. Increased security, governmental 
reform, and economic growth have combined to produce a unique moment in 
recent Palestinian history. The P.A. should learn from the successes and 
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failures of Gaza's experiment with private water management, and pursue an 
effective mix of regulation, investment incentives, and possible subsidy 
support to meet Palestinian needs. 
Finally, privatizing water development in the West Bank can have a 
salutary effect on the peace process. Legal feuding over Oslo II has 
exacerbated tensions between Israel and the Palestinian Authority and added 
another conflict to the long list of disagreements contributing to the 
diplomatic dead-lock. Removing the water issue from the negotiations arena 
and reducing Palestinian dependence on Israeli water allocation could help 
diffuse the atmosphere. There is no guarantee that such efforts will help lay 
the road to Final Status Negotiations—there are myriad of other boulders 
obstructing that path, but it certainly cannot hurt. 
Some things in the Middle East never change; a permanent water 
scarcity may well be one of them. Still, while Moses and the Israelites needed 
God in order to strike water from rock, the West Bank Palestinians of the 21st 
century do not. 
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APPENDIX I 
The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip, September 28, 1995 (OSLO II). ANNEX III, ARTICLE 40. 
On the basis of good-will, both sides have reached the following 
agreement in the sphere of Water and Sewage: 
Principles 
1. Israel recognizes the Palestinian water rights in the West Bank. 
These will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations and 
settled in the Permanent Status Agreement relating to the various 
water resources. 
2. Both sides recognize the necessity to develop additional water for 
various uses. 
3. While respecting each side's powers and responsibilities in the 
sphere of water and sewage in their respective areas, both sides 
agree to coordinate the management of water and sewage resources 
and systems in the West Bank during the interim period, in 
accordance with the following principles: 
a. Maintaining existing quantities of utilization from the 
resources, taking into consideration the quantities of 
additional water for the Palestinians from the Eastern Aquifer 
and other agreed sources in the West Bank as detailed in this 
Article. 
b. Preventing the deterioration of water quality in water 
resources. 
c. Using the water resources in a manner which will ensure 
sustainable use in the future, in quantity and quality. 
d. Adjusting the utilization of the resources according to variable 
climatological and hydrological conditions. 
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e. Taking all necessary measures to prevent any harm to water 
resources, including those utilized by the other side. 
f. Treating, reusing or properly disposing of all domestic, urban, 
industrial, and agricultural sewage. 
g. Existing water and sewage systems shall be operated, 
maintained and developed in a coordinated manner, as set out 
in this Article. 
h. Each side shall take all necessary measures to prevent any 
harm to the water and sewage systems in their respective 
areas. 
i. Each side shall ensure that the provisions of this Article are 
applied to all resources and systems, including those privately 
owned or operated, in their respective areas. 
Transfer of Authority 
4. The Israeli side shall transfer to the Palestinian side, and the 
Palestinian side shall assume, powers and responsibilities in the 
sphere of water and sewage in the West Bank related solely to 
Palestinians, that are currently held by the military government and 
its Civil Administration, except for the issues that will be 
negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, in accordance with 
the provisions of this Article. 
5. The issue of ownership of water and sewage related infrastructure 
in the West Bank will be addressed in the permanent status 
negotiations. 
Additional Water 
6. Both sides have agreed that the future needs of the Palestinians in 
the West Bank are estimated to be between 70–80 mcm/year. 
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7. In this framework, and in order to meet the immediate needs of the 
Palestinians in fresh water for domestic use, both sides recognize 
the necessity to make available to the Palestinians during the 
interim period a total quantity of 28.6 mcm/year, as detailed below: 
a. Israeli Commitment: 
(1) Additional supply to Hebron and the Bethlehem area, 
including the construction of the required pipeline—1 
mcm/year. 
(2) Additional supply to Ramallah area—0.5 mcm/year. 
(3) Additional supply to an agreed take-off point in the Salfit 
area—0.6 mcm/year. 
(4) Additional supply to the Nablus area—1 mcm/year. 
(5) The drilling of an additional well in the Jenin area—1.4 
mcm/year. 
(6) Additional supply to the Gaza Strip—5 mcm/year. 
(7) The capital cost of items (1) and (5) above shall be borne by 
Israel. 
b. Palestinian Responsibility: 
(1) An additional well in the Nablus area—2.1 mcm/year. 
(2) Additional supply to the Hebron, Bethlehem and Ramallah 
areas from the Eastern Aquifer or other agreed sources in the 
West Bank—17 mcm/year. 
(3) A new pipeline to convey the 5 mcm/year from the existing 
Israeli water system to the Gaza Strip. In the future, this 
quantity will come from desalination in Israel. 
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(4) The connecting pipeline from the Salfit take-off point to 
Salfit. 
(5) The connection of the additional well in the Jenin area to the 
consumers. 
(6) The remainder of the estimated quantity of the Palestinian 
needs mentioned in paragraph 6 above, over the quantities 
mentioned in this paragraph (41.4—51.4 mcm/year), shall be 
developed by the Palestinians from the Eastern Aquifer and 
other agreed sources in the West Bank. The Palestinians will 
have the right to utilize this amount for their needs (domestic 
and agricultural) . . . . 
8. The provisions of paragraphs 6-7 above shall not prejudice the 
provisions of paragraph 1 to this Article . . . . 
The Joint Water Committee 
11. In order to implement their undertakings under this Article, the two 
sides will establish, upon the signing of this Agreement, a 
permanent Joint Water Committee (JWC) for the interim period, 
under the auspices of the CAC. 
12. The function of the JWC shall be to deal with all water and sewage 
related issues in the West Bank including, inter alia: 
a. Coordinated management of water resources. 
b. Coordinated management of water and sewage systems. 
c. Protection of water resources and water and sewage systems. 
d. Exchange of information relating to water and sewage laws 
and regulations. 
e. Overseeing the operation of the joint supervision and 
enforcement mechanism. 
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f. Resolution of water and sewage related disputes. 
g. Cooperation in the field of water and sewage, as detailed in 
this Article. 
h. Arrangements for water supply from one side to the other. 
i. Monitoring systems. The existing regulations concerning 
measurement and monitoring shall remain in force until the 
JWC decides otherwise. 
j. Other issues of mutual interest in the sphere of water and 
sewage. 
13. The JWC shall be comprised of an equal number of representatives 
from each side. 
14. All decisions of the JWC shall be reached by consensus, including 
the agenda, its procedures and other matters. 
15. Detailed responsibilities and obligations of the JWC for the 
implementation of its functions are set out in Schedule 8. 
Supervision and Enforcement Mechanism 
16. Both sides recognize the necessity to establish a joint mechanism 
for supervision over and enforcement of their agreements in the 
field of water and sewage, in the West Bank. 
17. For this purpose, both sides shall establish, upon the signing of this 
Agreement, Joint Supervision and Enforcement Teams (JSET), 
whose structure, role, and mode of operation is detailed in 
Schedule 9. . . . 
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APPENDIX II 
Map of West Bank Mountain Aquifer 
(http://mapsomething.com/demo/waterusage/hydrology.php) 
 
 
